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We explore the implications of models with increasing returns, endogenous variety and firm-level
heterogeneity for the quantification of the gains from trade. We first focus on the impact of trade liberalization
on imported variety by analyzing the experience of Costa Rica from 1986 to 1992. We find that although
liberalization triggered a sizable increase in variety, the resulting welfare gains were small because
of strong heterogeneity across imported goods. Upon trade liberalization, the new varieties are imported
in small quantities, and hence contribute little to welfare. We then present a model with firm-level
increasing returns, differentiated goods, monopolistic competition, endogenous variety and free entry
to show that total variety (domestic plus imported) can either increase, decrease or remain constant
with trade liberalization. More importantly, the gains from trade do not depend on what happens to
total variety. In fact, we find that, conditional on the estimated elasticities of trade with respect to trade
costs, models with increasing returns, endogenous variety, free or restricted entry, and firm-level heterogeneity
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There is a common perception that the gains from trade are larger than what quantitative
general-equilibrium models of trade can explain. A recurring goal in the trade literature has
been to ￿nd new channels through which such models can generate larger gains. A prominent
example is Paul Romer (1994), where trade allows for the consumption of a wider variety of
goods, and this generates additional bene￿ts not included in standard calculations. We start
in Section 2 by showing that the connection postulated by Romer between trade liberalization
and increasing variety is present in the data by focusing on the experience of Costa Rica from
1986 to 1992. Romer performed a numerical exercise to show, in response to higher tari⁄s,
the welfare losses operating through reduced variety may be an order of magnitude larger than
losses in standard trade analysis (the Harberger Triangles). In Section 3 we use our Costa Rican
data to evaluate this result by applying a method introduced by Robert C. Feenstra (1994) to
compute the gains from increased imported variety for the 1986-1992 period. We ￿nd very small
gains, and show that this is due to strong heterogeneity across imported goods. Upon trade
liberalization, the new varieties are imported in small quantities, and hence contribute little to
welfare. We refer to this e⁄ect as the e⁄ect of ￿curvature￿in weakening the variety gains from
trade. In Section 4 we relate this result to recent models of ￿rm-level heterogeneity and derive
a simple formula that shows the e⁄ect of curvature.
These results do no take into account the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on domestic variety.
But it seems reasonable to think that an increase in import competition would cause a decline
in domestic variety as domestic ￿rms exit. In fact, the evidence does suggest that trade liber-
alization leads to exit by domestic ￿rms (James Tybout, 2003). Consistent with this, domestic
variety is endogenous in most recent models and falls with a decline in trade costs.1 In Section
5 we present a model with ￿rm-level increasing returns, di⁄erentiated goods, monopolistic com-
petition, endogenous variety and free entry to show that, as in Richard E. Baldwin and Rikard
Forslid (2004), total variety (domestic plus imported) can either increase, decrease or remain
constant with trade liberalization. More importantly, the gains from trade do not depend on
what happens to total variety. In fact, we ￿nd that the real wage is ultimately dependent on the
ratio of imports to total expenditure with an elasticity that is the same across a range of models.
1See Marc J. Melitz (2003), Thomas Chaney (2007), Jonathan Eaton, Samuel Kortum and Francis Kramarz
(2007), and Costas Arkolakis (2008).
1We will argue that, conditional on the estimated elasticities of trade with respect to trade costs,
the implications of models with increasing returns, endogenous variety, free or restricted entry,
and heterogeneity (or not) across ￿rms have exactly the same implications for welfare gains
from trade liberalization as traditional models.2 In our view, the contribution of the new trade
models is not to provide new channels for gains from trade, but rather to explain the levels and
microfoundations of trade that we observe.
2 Variety and Tari⁄s in Costa Rica
Our dataset consists of Costa Rican imports of each of 1,338 products from up to 111 countries
over 1986 to 1992. The product categories correspond to the NAUCA II classi￿cation used by
Central American countries over this period (see Peter J. Klenow and AndrØs Rodr￿guez-Clare,
1997, for an explanation of this classi￿cation system and our data sources). We have data on
kilos and U.S. dollars of imports (c.i.f.) for each product-country-year, as well as the tari⁄
applying to each product-year.
We take country of origin as the demarcation of a variety (i.e., cars from the U.S. are a
di⁄erent variety than cars from Germany or Japan) and think of total variety for a good as
the number of countries from which there were imports in a product category.3 In our dataset,
variety rose from an average of 8.2 in a category in 1986 to 11.5 in 1992 for the 369 consumer
goods, and from 7.9 to 8.8 for the 969 intermediate and capital goods (hereafter just intermediate
goods). Weighting each product category by total dollar imports, variety rose from 19.1 to 24
for consumer goods, and from 13.6 to 15.6 for intermediate goods. Over this period average
tari⁄s fell from 48.8% to 22.5% for consumer goods, and from 17.1% to 12.9% for intermediate
goods.4 Dollar-weighted tari⁄s fell from 43.3% to 20.3% for consumer goods, and from 11.2% to
10.0% for intermediate goods. Consumption goods imports rose from 5.4% of GDP in 1986 to
8.1% in 1992. The share of intermediate goods imports rose from 23.3% to 27.2% of GDP over
the same period.
2This assertion will be valid under the standard assumption that productivities are distributed Pareto, but
may not be valid under alternative distributions.
3See Klenow and Rodr￿guez-Clare (1997) for a discussion of the limitations of this measure of variety.
4The standard deviation of tari⁄ rates also fell sharply, from 37% to 12% for consumer goods, and from 17%
to 7% for intermediate goods.
2Table 1: The Impact of Market Size on Variety
Consumer Intermediate
Market Size 0.264 0.121 0.257 0.121
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.004)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product dummies No Yes No Yes
￿ R2 0.479 0.883 0.465 0.882
# observations 2,583 6,783
Before considering the e⁄ect of tari⁄ reductions on variety at the detailed product level, it
is useful to examine the underlying premise that greater market size boosts variety, as implied
by ￿xed costs of importing a given product from a given country.
Table 1 presents the results from regressing variety on market size for consumer and interme-
diate goods, respectively. Each observation is a product-year, e.g. cars in 1990. The dependent
variable is the natural log of variety, while the independent variable is the natural log of market
size (imports of a product summed across all countries in a year). Year e⁄ects are included to
deal with general in￿ ation in dollar imports. The results show that variety is greater in larger
markets, both for consumer and intermediate goods. Instead of larger markets pulling in more
varieties due to ￿xed costs, however, exogenously larger categories could include more countries
just because they are more aggregated. To explore this possibility, we added product dummies to
the regression. As shown in Table 1, the elasticity is roughly halved but it remains economically
and statistically signi￿cant. The fact that the elasticity of variety with respect to market size is
well below one, however, implies either that ￿xed costs are increasing in market size (albeit less
than proportionately) or ever-less-important varieties are imported by bigger markets.5
With some con￿dence that market size a⁄ects variety, we examined whether products with
falling tari⁄s see rising variety. Our identifying assumption is that product di⁄erences in tari⁄
changes are exogenous. Table 2 presents the results from regressing the natural log of variety
on the natural log of the gross tari⁄ rate. Including year and product dummies, we ￿nd an
economically and statistically signi￿cant negative association between variety and tari⁄s. Table
2 also shows that lower imports go along with higher tari⁄s for a product, consistent with the
5Measuring market size as country GDP, David Hummels and Peter J. Klenow (2002) similarly found a strong
relationship between market size and import variety. And Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2007) document that
more French ￿rms export to larger economies.
3Table 2: The Impact of Tari⁄s on Variety and Market Size
Consumer Intermediate
Variety Market Size Variety Market Size
Tari⁄s -0.818 1.832 -0.289 -0.540
(0.111) (0.291) (0.102) (0.291)
￿ R2 0.873 0.873 0.867 0.847
# observations 2,583 6,783
Table 3: Feenstra Ratios
[1992 Imports / 1986 Imports] Consumer Intermediate
All country-product pairs 2.869 1.904
Common country-product pairs 2.829 1.904
All / Common 1.014 1
Feenstra Ratio with ￿=6 0.997 1
hypothesis that higher tari⁄s reduce variety by shrinking the market.
3 Variety Gains in Costa Rica
Feenstra (1994) shows how to adjust the standard import price index for changing variety,
including our case, where marginal varieties appear less important than inframarginal ones. We













Here vi are imports from country-product pair i in 1986 and ￿ is the set of country-product
pairs imported in 1986, and the corresponding values with primes refer to 1992.
Table 3 has the ingredients of the Feenstra Ratio as well as the ratio itself. The ￿rst row says
that current dollar imports grew by a factor of 2.87 for consumer goods and 1.90 for intermediate
goods from 1986 to 1992. But the next row indicates that imports grew almost as much for
￿common￿country-product pairs (those with imports in both 1986 and 1992): by a factor of
2.83 for consumer goods and 1.90 for intermediate goods. The following row says that overall
consumer imports grew 1.4% faster than for common country-product pairs, whereas overall
4intermediate imports grew at the same rate as for common pairs. For the Feenstra Ratios we
use ￿ = 6 based on the estimates in Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein (2006) for higher
and lower levels of aggregation than in the Costa Rican product categories. Using this value, the
Feenstra Ratio is 0.997 for consumer goods and 1 for intermediates, suggesting a very modest
downward adjustment of 0.3% to the price index for consumer imports, and none at all for
intermediates.
How can we reconcile such modest adjustments with the surge in variety of about 25% for
consumer goods (from 19.1 to 24) and 15% for intermediate goods (from 13.6 to 15.6)? The
answer is that the new varieties must not be as important as incumbent ones.6 For example,
adding South Korea as a source of cars may not be as important as already having access to
cars from Japan, the U.S., and Germany.7
4 The role of curvature
Consider a continuum of foreign varieties indexed by s and ordered in terms of decreasing quality
or increasing marginal cost. With CES preferences and an elasticity of substitution ￿ > 1, there
will be some n such that all varieties s 2 [0;n] are imported. This n will be lower than total
foreign variety if importing entails a ￿xed cost. Consider an increase in imported variety from
n to n0. Taking the log derivative of the Feenstra ratio for this case with respect to n0; we ￿nd
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The ￿rst term is the standard elasticity of welfare with respect to variety (love of variety)
under CES preferences. The second is an adjustment for ￿curvature￿ . A low value for this
6Looking at trade liberalization episodes, Timothy J. Kehoe and Kim J. Ruhl (2003) found that varieties which
were traded little or not at all before liberalization contributed a lot to new trade. Arkolakis (2008) similarly
showed that the U.S. tari⁄ declines associated with NAFTA led to an increase in imported variety from Mexico,
but that the new varieties were imported in relatively small quantities.
7Our results may seem at odds with those of Broda and Weinstein (2006). But the two exercises are quite
di⁄erent. Broda and Weinstein (2006) quantify the gains from the introduction of new varieties in the rest of
the world that are eventually imported into the U.S. This is very di⁄erent from the e⁄ects of trade liberalization.
Whereas greater import variety in response to trade liberalization entails consuming less desirable varieties (that
is why they were not imported before), an expansion of import variety in time is more likely to be associated with
the introduction of important (infra-marginal) varieties abroad, which are more likely to contribute signi￿cantly
to welfare.
5term implies that marginal varieties have either low quality (preference) parameters or high
international prices, so the gains from increased variety are smaller.
A nice expression for this curvature adjustment can be obtained if we assume that the
preference parameter, quality, or productivity is distributed Pareto. Under the productivity
interpretation and with monopolistic competition, domestic prices of foreign varieties will be
proportional to the inverse of productivity, ￿, and v(s) will be proportional to ￿(s)￿￿1, v(s) =
A￿(s)￿￿1 for some A > 0. Assume that there is a continuum of goods with exogenous measure
M and Pr(￿ < e ￿) = G(e ￿) ￿ 1 ￿ (b=e ￿)￿, where e ￿ ￿ b > 0 and ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1. Note for future
reference that an increase in ￿ implies less dispersion in that more of the productivities are
closer to the minimum b. If the ￿xed importing cost is the same across varieties, then pro￿ts
will be increasing in productivity ￿, and there will be a ￿￿ such that all inputs with ￿ > ￿￿ are











Note that high curvature (low ￿) decreases the impact of love of variety.8
As mentioned in Section 2, in Costa Rica the mean (weighted) variety for consumer goods
went from 19.1 in 1986 to 24 in 1992, an increase of 25:6%. Given the result in the previous
section that the Feenstra Ratio for this period is 0:997(a welfare gain of 0:3% thanks to increased
variety for ￿ = 6), we have that 0:256 ￿ " = 0:003. Using the expression in (2) for " and ￿ = 6,
we get ￿ = 5:3. By comparison, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2007) - henceforth EKK - use
data on exports and domestic sales by French ￿rms to estimate that ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) = 1:5. If ￿ = 6;
this means ￿ = 7:5, just a bit lower than the central value for ￿ (i.e., ￿ = 8) in Jonathan Eaton
and Samuel Kortum (2002). The Costa Rican experience suggests somewhat greater curvature
than this. This di⁄erence matters for the welfare implications of the observed increase in variety
in Costa Rica. If instead of ￿ = 5:3 we used the lower curvature associated with ￿ = 7:5, then
" = 0:067, and the variety gains would be 1:7% rather than our 0:3%. Of course, this di⁄erence
could be due to the fact that in the Costa Rican data we are interpreting variety with country
of origin, whereas in EKK variety is associated with the number of ￿rms that serve a particular
8This result does not depend on the implicit assumption that there is a unique ￿xed cost for all foreign varieties.
In separate work we have established that if the ￿xed cost is distributed Pareto and is independent of ￿; then this
result remains valid.
6market.
5 Endogenous Domestic Variety and Free Entry
The previous discussion has taken foreign variety to be exogenous and simply performed a
comparative statics exercise with respect to variety. We also ignored any e⁄ects of trade lib-
eralization on the variety of goods o⁄ered by domestic ￿rms. What happens to total available
variety (domestic plus foreign) following trade liberalization? Baldwin and Forslid (2004) ad-
dress this question through a modi￿ed Melitz (2003) model with two asymmetric countries under
exogenous wages. They show that if the ￿xed cost of supplying the home market is higher for
foreign than for domestic ￿rms, then total available variety falls with a decline in the costs of
trade. They refer to this as the ￿anti-variety e⁄ect￿of trade liberalization. Here we present
a model with endogenous wages and N > 2 countries to generalize the Baldwin and Forslid
(2004) result. More important, we show that, conditional on the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on
imports, all major quantitative models of trade deliver the same gains.9
As above, there is a continuum of goods and preferences are CES with an elasticity of
substitution ￿ > 1. We denote the exporting country by i and the importing country by j,
where i;j = 1;:::;N. Given a measure Lj of identical consumers in country j, the demand
for a ￿rm with productivity ￿ from country i charging a price pij (￿) in country j is xij (￿) =
pij (￿)
￿￿ P￿￿1
j wjLj, where wj is the wage and Pj is the price index.10 Each ￿rm must pay a
￿xed cost (in terms of labor in the destination country) to enter a particular market that varies
across country pairs, fij, and also incurs iceberg transportation costs ￿ij > 1 with ￿ii = 1. Firms
from i with ￿ ￿ ￿￿
ij will export to market j. The cut-o⁄ productivities ￿￿
ij are determined by













9One drawback of the model we present here is that we treat tari⁄s as transportation costs. This does not
seem problematic for our purposes here. See Svetlana Demidova and AndrØs Rodr￿guez-Clare (2007) for a full
welfare analysis in a Melitz-type model for a small-economy.







1￿￿ M￿j￿￿j (￿)d￿, ￿￿j (￿) is the density of productivities
of ￿rms from source country ￿ conditional on selling to country j, and M￿j is the measure of ￿rms from ￿ selling
to j.
7Firms have to pay a ￿xed entry cost, fe, in order to enter the market and draw a productivity
realization. New entrants draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution, as above.11 If a
￿rm gets a productivity draw below ￿￿
ii, it exits immediately without operating. Thus, because
of free entry, in equilibrium expected pro￿ts of a ￿rm must be equal to entry costs. In other
words, the product of the probability of getting a productivity draw above ￿￿
ii and the average
pro￿ts must equal the entry cost. The free entry condition together with the labor market





















￿ ￿ ￿ + 1 | {z }
average sales of operating ￿rms
. (5)
De￿ne the fraction of total income of country j spent on goods from country i by ￿ij. Using the














Remarkably, even with free entry the equation determining market shares, (6), turns out to
be quite similar to the one introduced by Eaton and Kortum (2002). In particular, market share
appears to be changing in the same elasticity with respect to the cost factors, ￿ij and wi. This
expression is identical to that of Chaney (2007), who does not assume free entry, but rather a
predetermined number of potential suppliers.
Using equation (5) and the de￿nition of ￿ij that implies Tij = ￿ijwjLj, it follows that the











ii > bi, 8i 6= j.























This is a generalization of the Baldwin and Forslid (2004) result. In particular, increasing any
￿￿j (trade liberalization) has an anti-variety e⁄ect if and only if f￿j > fjj, 8￿ 6= j. Intuitively,
if f￿j > fjj then the marginal variety from country ￿ entails a lower price than the marginal
domestic variety, so for each new foreign variety more than one domestic variety is displaced.






























Consider ￿rst a closed economy, with ￿jj = 1. A larger population increases welfare with
an elasticity of 1=(￿ ￿ 1). This is the standard result in models with love of variety and no
heterogeneity, but di⁄ers from the results in Chaney (2007), EKK, and Arkolakis (2008), where
this elasticity is 1=(￿￿1)￿1=￿. The reason why curvature does not a⁄ect the gains from size in
our set-up is that the number of goods (Nj) produced by an economy increases proportionately
with Lj. Thus, contrary to models with no free entry, consumers in a country with larger
population are not forced to consume varieties produced with lower productivities. On the other
hand, a decline in the ￿xed cost of operation, fjj, increases welfare with elasticity 1=(￿￿1)￿1=￿.
This shows how curvature decreases the variety gains associated with love of variety. A decline
in the entry cost fe, on the other hand, increases welfare with elasticity 1=￿. Here greater
curvature entails a higher elasticity. The reason for this is that a lower fe leads to more entry
while the number of operating ￿rms remains the same. This entails more selection, the bene￿ts
of which are increasing with heterogeneity, or 1=￿.
Trade costs, ￿ij, and marketing costs, fij, a⁄ect real wages only indirectly through ￿jj. Thus,
we can think of the welfare e⁄ects of trade liberalization as a reduction in ￿jj. In fact, in a
proper calibration exercise, looking at the e⁄ects of trade liberalization involves matching ￿jj
before and after the trade liberalization. In this model, ￿jj in￿ uences welfare with an elasticity
9of ￿1=￿, exactly the same way as in Eaton and Kortum￿ s (2002) model of pure Ricardian trade
(with no variety) and also the same as in Chaney (2007) and Arkolakis (2008). In fact, it can also
be shown that in Paul R. Krugman￿ s (1980) model of trade, where varieties are homogenous and
there is no variety e⁄ect, welfare is proportional to ￿
￿1=(￿￿1)
ii . Noting that the relevant elasticity
estimated in this model is ￿ ￿ 1 rather than ￿, the gains from trade are the same.
It is important to note that the result that trade liberalization a⁄ects welfare with an elasti-
city of ￿1=￿ is valid, even if fij 6= fjj, so that changes in ￿jj do a⁄ect total variety. To understand
this, consider the case with fij < fjj, so that an increase in ￿ij (with a corresponding decline
in ￿jj) increases total variety. Given fij < fjj, the varieties that enter from abroad have prices
that are higher than the domestic ones that are displaced, and it turns out that this exactly
o⁄sets the gains associated with increased variety.
The broader implication of these results is that, given the estimated elasticities of trade ￿ ows
with respect to trade costs, the volume of trade itself determines the associated gains. Contrary
to what many have claimed, new trade models do not really o⁄er new gains from trade given
observed trade levels.
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